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I
]X recent years belief in a revealed religion has become impossible
for the great majority of people who have become informed
with regard to the historical origins of Christianity. For them it
is necessary that ethics assume and merit the position of authority
formerly held by the practical teachings of Christianity,—if they
are to be saved from an unperceived drifting toward the rapids of
practical materialism which after not many days can issue only in
the vortex of pessimism. Alan is too logical a creature to live hap-
pily with no answer to the ultimate questions of his duty to his fel-
lows, and he is too spiritual to do so with any answer which does
not somehow do justice to his very spirituality.
Candor forces us to admit that up to the present time no system
of ethics intellectually and spiritually satisfactory has ever been
formulated. In so far as an ethics has been self-consistent it has
necessarily been written from one rigidly defined point of view.
Therefore, although it has dealt in some fashion with all the prob-
lems of conduct, it obviously has done so from only one point of
view, and so has not been able to do full justice to all ethical truth.
This is often inadvertently acknowledged even in the systems
themselves. And therefore each system, if consistently carried out
in practice, would lead to flagrant injustice.
Let us consider first, for example, the a priori ethics of Kant.
If, as Kant teaches, an act is not moral which is in accord with
inclination, none is moral which will make anyone happy. If so,
then one ought constantly to do what will harm, or at most be in-
different to the good of, himself and others. But this conclusion
contradicts the conception of ethics held in common by Kant and
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all men, and it permits the commission of every injustice. Again.
Bentham, in naming the greatest good of the greatest number as
the end of ethical action, evidently repudiated the utilitarian basis
of his ethics, for utilitarianism cannot deny itself long enough to
look beyond immediate passion to the whole of the personality and
to the entire company of mankind. But if utilitarianism does not
supply a basis for disinterested action, it must, like the Kantian ab-
solutism, countenance every form of injustice. And finally, the
theories of self-realization provide no objective definition of the
self, and so at least permit an identification of the self with imme-
diate desire. But actually immediate desire never is regarded by
these systems as the whole of the personality. Thus these theories
also are self-contradictory and set no bar to indulgence in every
injustice. Ethics has had a history quite as contradictory as has
theology—each system being opposed to all others and not even at
peace with itself. If the history of ethics has not been as turbu-
lent as that of theology, it has not been so only because to ethics
humanity has never entrusted its supreme interests. The ethics of
the future, the true ethics, while forming a consistent system and
recognizing all concrete values, must not be a one-sided, contradic-
tory, organization of human relationships—a mere abstraction. But
how can we conceive of such an ethics?
We can construct a valid and authoritative ethics, I believe, if
we bear in mind that we get into our unfortunately abstract ethics
by forgetting that ethics is ultimately practical. We forget that it
deals with full-orbed acts and not with one-sided abstractions. Let
us therefore cast about for some acts to be the basis of ethics—its
organizing principle, if such a phrase is not already too abstract a
designation for the basis of a concrete system of ethics—a desig-
nation which will lead us imperceptibly into an abstract system.
I would suggest that we consider if we shall not have in the follow-
ing acts that basis of a concrete system of ethics for which we are
looking :
—
(1) The provision for one's self and dependents of a comfortable
way of living.
(2) The provision of a fund for taking part in various charities.
(3) The cultivation of the non-competitive values.
It will be noticed that these acts form a necessary, Hegelian,
trilogy of thesis (personal and family interest), antithesis (the in-
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terest of others) and synthesis (the common interest of self and
others). The acts ascend from the practical to the spiritual. Let
us consider each of these fundamental duties in some detail.
II
Everyone would admit, I believe, that it is the duty of every
able-bodied and able-minded man to provide a comfortable way of
living for his dependents. But they would differ as to just what
constitutes comfortable living. I think that all would agree that it
certainly includes the provision of the conditions of efficient living.
That is, I think that ever}'one would agree that it is the duty of
every normal man to strive to earn wages large enough to buy a
healthful environment and labor-saving devices for his family, for
thus his family is enabled to produce the most for itself and the
woild. Since some families are capable of making better use of
formal leisure than are others, it is ethically right for some to spend
much more on themselves than for others. A trip to Europe, for
instance, may bring forth a hundredfold in the soil of one family,
but leave sterile that of another. In the former case the taking of
such a trip would be ethical ; in the latter it would not be so.
But when we have gone this far in a definition of ethical ex-
penditures we have not exactly prescribed the duty of man with
regard to his standard of living, and I for one am glad that we have
not done so. Exact definition of ethical duty prevents the rhythmic
action of the human mind within limits which modern psychiatry
teaches us is absolutely essential to psychic health. Man needs a
goal but not a straight-jacket for normal, effective, happy living.
Duties cannot be exactly defined because the values to which they
refer cannot be rated absolutely. One value can frequently be sub-
stituted for another. No one value is essential for ethical living. We
often come to appreciate a certain new value only because we have
by chance played the harlequin to another now held in high rever-
ence.
Perhaps we can best make clear how values can be substituted
for each other, and show why it is impossible to enumerate those
which should govern the lives of men—in particular with regard
to their expenditures—by quoting a passage from Lamb's Essays
of Elia (Everyman Edition, p. 288). In this passage the delights
of an intense enjoyment of a few objects of art, such as is forced
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upon the poor, are substituted for the superficial enjoyment of many
such objects which is inevitable for the rich :
—
"
'I wish the good old times would come again', she (Lamb's
fictitious cousin) said, 'when we were not quite so rich. I do not
mean that I want to be poor ; but there was a middle state'-—so
she was pleased to ramble on,—'in which I am sure we were a great
deal happier. A purchase is but a purchase, now that aou have
money enough and to spare. Formerly it used to be a triumph.
When we coveted a cheap luxury (and, O! how much ado I had
to get }ou to consent in those times!)—we were used to having a
debate two or three days before, and to weigh the for and against,
and think what we might spare it out of, and what saving we could
hit upon, that should be an equivalent. A thing was worth buying
then, when we felt the money that we paid for it.'
"
'Do }ou remember the brown suit, which )'Ou made to hang
upon }ou, till all your friends cried shame upon you, it grew so
threadbare—and all because of that folio Beaumont and Fletcher,
which \ou dragged home late at night from Barker's in Covent
Garden ? Do }0U remember^ how we eyed it for weeks before we
could make up our minds to the purchase, and had not come to a
determination till it was near ten o'clock of the Saturday night,
when you set off from Islington, fearing you should be too late
—
and when the old bookseller with some grumbling opened his shop,
and by the twinkling taper (for he was setting bedwards) lighted
out the relic from his dusty treasures—and when you lugged it
home, wishing it were twice as cumbersome—and when you pre-
sented it to me—and when we were exploring the perfectness of
it (collating you called it)—and while I was repairing some of the
loose leaves with paste, which your impatience would not suffer to
be left till daybreak—was there no pleasure in being a poor man?
or can those neat black clothes which you wear now, and are so
careful to keep brushed, since we have become rich and finical,
give you half the honest vanity, with which you flaunted it about
in that overworn suit
—
your old corbeau—for four or five weeks
longer than you should have done, to pacify your conscience for the
mighty sum of fifteen—or sixteen shillings was it ?—a great affair
we thought it then—which you had lavished on the old folio. Now
you can afford to buy any book that pleases you, but I do not see
that you ever bring me home any nice old purchases now.' "
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A second question naturally arises with regard to man's duty
in providing for his family : how far should he injure others in se-
curing what he wants for himself? He should get out of his present
business if, when conducted honestly in respect to both consumer
and employee, it does not provide an adequate living—even at the
cost of reducing his family to the bare necessities of living. If
he can earn an adequate living at other employment, he should do
so; if not, he should without shame depend upon charity, for soci-
ety owes an honest man a living. In every concrete case, however,
the question arises whether the reason a man cannot make a living
is his honesty or is some lack in himself either of mental ability,
of emotional stability due to psychological complexes or of imper-
fect training. Since societ}- demands such a high standard of effi-
ciency today and since it is always possible to read a man's failures
in terms of the. environment (luxurious or poverty-stricken) in
which he was brought up, when a man finds himself for any cause
unable to provide for his family he should turn to charity for sup-
port till an adequate position can be secured for him and he be
fitted for it. If adequate charity, even, cannot be secured for him,
a man is justified in being dishonest, for a society which does not
provide even charity for its members cannot make any ethical
claims upon the individual and should be destroyed as a result of a
growing lack of mutual confidence. One can make evident the
evils of society only by himself acting evilly in view of them. If
an earthquake, war, or other "act of God" has made temporarily
impossible the earning of a living for one's self or family, the dut}'
to do so does not exist. The suffering which ensues has nothing
at all to do with human morality,—whatever we may think about
the way it ought to affect the divine conscience.
In support of the contention made above that in extreme and
irremediable need a man may be dishonest, I shall adduce the opin-
ion of the leading Christian theologians in the days before prop-
erty became sacrosanct in the western world :
—
"The Fathers, as we have seen, held that almsgiving was an act
of justice, not of mercy, because the rights of private property
cannot alter the fact that God meant the earth to furnish its fruits
for the maintenance of all men. The Canonists, too, set out very
clearly the principle that no man has really the right to hold for
himself more than he needs. Gratian cites, as from St. Ambrose,
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a passage denouncing as unjust and avaricious the man who con-
sumes in kixury what might have supphed the needs of those who
are in want, and maintaining that it is as great a crime to refuse
the necessaries of life to those who are in want as it is to take from
a man the things which are his ... St. Thomas . . . main-
tains that ... if there is evident and urgent need, a man may
legitimately take either openly or by stealth what he needs . . .
In the case of extreme necessity, St. Thomas says, all things are
common." (Property, edited by Bishop Gore, p. 136).
A nice, critical question arises when one considers what a man
ought to do if he faces this situation: that he cannot earn his liv-
ing honestly if he has a child, but that he knows ways of earning
dishonestly the money necessary for the wise rearing of a child.
He should not be dishonest and bring a child into being, for a life
based upon persistent dishonesty would not be worthwhile for
either parent or child. But the man would be justified in bringing
a child into the world and then in accepting all possible charity and
in joining whatever reformatory movements exist in order that
larger opportunities might be provided for all workers of average
ability.
It may be claimed, however, that decisions as to whether or not
to bring children into the world are not based on abstract ethical
considerations—as the foregoing discussion would imply. I am
not so sure. I believe that abstract considerations do lie behind
the concrete problems which parents consider when discussing pro-
creation. Certainly it is a general rule that outstanding idealism
grows dim when marriage and family responsibility press upon a
man, and often the necessities of the family, hovering like a bird
of prey over a man's head, lead him to employ shady business
methods. One need not be too careful, however, about foreseeing
how one's family will be provided for before bringing it into being.
For the struggle against odds and the necessity of taking advan-
tage of every opportunity—however adventitious—which a family
which is plainly not secure must experience will give the children
in it just the training essential to great success—as an acrobat, the
minister of an unorthodox church, a candidate for the presidency
of the United States or a stock broker. I once heard a man say of
another that he had the native ability to be a great success—and
would have become so if onlv he had been born a bastard.
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III
In addition to providing for one's family a man should earn
and set aside funds to be expended in charity. The size of these
funds should be proportioned to the smallness of the increment of
additional cost which its amassing would necessitate in the sale
price of the article which he manufactures, or upon the size of his
income if he cannot dictate the sale price of his "line"—either be-
cause of the severely competitive conditions in his industry or be-
cause he has not an executive position; or if he is in a profession
and works on salary. Thus a man who needs to add, say, ten cents
on the hundred dollars to the retail price of his article or deduct
ten cents on the hundred dollars from the pay of his employees in
order to amass a million dollars for charity should do so. But one
who would need in the former case to add one dollar on a hundred
or in the latter to deduce one on a hundred ought not to create a
fund of more than perhaps ten thousand dollars for charit}-. Of
course a man who works on a fixed income or on a salary should
give to charity in proportion to his income or salary and in inverse
proportion to his necessary expenses.
It is not right for a man to amass a great charit}- fund at the
expense of his ultimate consumers or of his employees. If this
were generallv done, too large a place would be given to charity
in the general economic scheme of things and honest labor would
be discouraged. Yet it is requisite that some money be earned in
order that it may be given to others. In the first place, the very
fact that a man can earn the money suggests that for it he can
give more immediately valuable service to society than can anyone
else. Therefore it is socially important that he earns it—earn it
even if he cannot well spend it on himself and so will find it almost
necessary to give it to charit}-. In the second place, many people
who are capable of making excellent deferred payments to society
for all they receive can give small service till aided by charity.
Them it is morally necessary to aid. They may produce a hundred-
fold upon the investment made in them by their benefactors. The
provisions for the needs of the able poor also have this subsidiary
effect: it enables them to force the comfortably rich to remain at
work in order to retain their relative place in society. Thus one
may through wise giving to specific institutions or persons raise
to some extent the general level of national attainment. In the
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third place, there is an element of chance in human success and
failure. As we have already pointed out, it is always possible to
read a failure—if not due to congenital weakness, in which case
society must assume permanent charge of the sufferer—as due to
the warping effect of an environment in which society has allowed
the mal-adapted person to grow up from earliest infancy. It is
only right, therefore, that society should seek increasingly by wise
charity to rectify the more glaring freaks of fortune and the effects
of unfavorable environments upon the individuals who have been
harmed by them. And finally, in establishing the poor in comfortable
circumstances their benefactors increase the actual consumption of
goods ( ph}sical and mental ) by society—including those which the
benefactors themselves produce. Thus by their charities they in-
crease their own incomes. Also by increasing the number of effi-
cient workers by their charity they decrease the cost of living in the
country, and so the cost of their own living.
IV
The third duty of man is to cultivate the non-competitive values.
By the non-competitive values we mean, in the first place, the ar-
tistic values, for these a person can enjoy without lessening their
enjoyment by others, for instance,—listening to music, viewing art,
taking part in conversation. Perhaps the chief question which
naturally would arise with regard to their cultivation is : how much
should one spend in doing so? That depends upon the extent of
his genius and upon whether or not he hopes ever to entertain
others by the use of his gifts. If there is no marked ability, there
can be no absolute rule. We must revert to what we said above
about the expenses which a man is justified in incurring for his
famil}-. Even if by certain concrete expenditures some values are
neglected, others, however, will neverthless by the same expendi-
tures be advanced; and so, if the cultivation of values is the con-
sistent aim of one's life, his life will be as full as possible of some
sort of value, and that is the only justified goal for anyone.
By the non-competitive values we mean, in the second place, the
virtues. The cultivation of no virtue prevents its cultivation by
others ; and most virtues immediately, all ultimately, bring men into
reconciliation. We mean all the virtues, but no one taken singly,
for each virtue taken singly leads off upon a path diverse from the
THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN 723
Others, a path at length ending in a quagmire of absurdity. Thus
if with Paul of Tarsus one puts love upon the supreme throne, high
and lifted up, he finds that the requisite devotion to it requires
that he approve of unworthy forms of conduct. If he enlarges the
boundaries of love to include hate of the unloveable, he has robbed
lo\ e of an\' distinctive meaning. If to avoid this predicament, one
name redemption of wrong-doers as the final purpose of his life.
he will become oversensitive to the faults of others, self-righteous,
hard. Ever reasoning acutely in defense of his own position, he
will be incapable of seeing what lies beyond it. But something al-
ways does lie beyond every concrete judgment of creatures of time
and space. No judgment is absolute, fit to be the standard to which
all other truth must logically conform,—except only a devotion to
all values such as we here advocate. If one attempt to be faithful
to every virtue taken singly, he will be plunged into a "sad weigh-
ing and discussion of sin," from which the tortured soul can never
be set free. For, as we ha^•e seen, each virtue leads in an opposite
direction. No sooner would one heed the call of one than he would
hear the cry of the rest. And in the service of no one of the others
would he find greater peace. The only possibility for ethical liv-
ing lies in a serene devotion to all the virtues conceived as an ulti-
mate unity. But, it will be asked, how can such a general law de-
termine concrete speech and conduct?
( 1 ) A general law of moralit}' can determine concrete speech
and conduct, in the first place, because the mind in the last analysis
is one. There is only one stream of consciousness. Therefore there
is no such thing at the time of action—however we ma}- botanize
afterwards—as a general intention as separated from the deter-
mination to do some specific act.
(2) In the second place, the life of one who has sworn high
fealty to all the virtues is so ennobled that he envies no one. Not
all the wealth of Atlantis could enrich him. Therefore, for him
it is not possible to encroach upon the rights of others. His acts
and speech must be essentially just. Noblesse oblige in all his re-
lations with his fellow men becomes the inevitable expression of
the acknowledged imperial nature of his soul. Yet as his patent
of nobility has come only from his service to the non-competitive
values, it cannot inspire within his soul a prideful distinction be-
tween himself and other men. He must simply rejoice at every
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evidence that he can find in the lives of others that the ancient
virtues increasingly extend their sway.
(3) In the third place^ one who governs his life by all the vir-
tues acts virtuously in concrete situations because he will not allow
any virtue taken singly to assume undue importance in his decision.
He will act in view of the sum total of all his past experience and
of his unprejudiced understanding of the situation before him.
These will give the special form that his general ethical purpose
will take. If his decision is not in accord with that of another
man, he will listen to the argument of the other without prejudice.
He will listen without the arbitrary protruding of any special part
of past experience which prevents the judging of the argument on
the basis of the totality of past experience. When one does this
he is acting normally. Of course one who claims that he is acting
in view of all past experience and the objective facts of the present
situation may not actually be doing so ; but in that case he is not
sincerely trying to serve non-competitive values either—whatever
his claims may be. If through some defect of past experience one
act unjustly in any case, the injustice is not a moral fault on the
actor's part, and knowledge of its consequences will soon repair
the defect in his experience upon which it was based. By describ-
ing ethics so one makes it practical. He makes the good life pos-
sible for all men. For all men, except those under unrealized nerv-
ous strain, can control the obtruding special idea by the sum total
of experience.
(4) In the fourth place, a general devotion to ethical values
can determine concrete deeds because it is possible to embody in
a concrete deed several conflicting values. This can be done by
the use of different organs of the body,—while condemning with
words one can reveal a brotherly feeling by putting a hand on the
shoulder.
_
It can be done by expressing a position as one's own
which is a compromise between all the various truths implicit in a
situation. It can be done by expressing successively (perhaps at
different times ) the various truths implicit in a situation.
Concrete ethical decisions, we say, depend upon the special na-
ture of one's past experience and the special nature of each situa-
tion that presents itself. Therefore it is impossible more exactly
than we have done to show how a general devotion to ethical ideals
determines concrete deeds. It is never possible to recount fully the
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sum total of a man's past experience (conscious and unconscious)
and to describe fully any concrete situation. Even the United
States Supreme Court with its libraries of precedents to guide its
judgments will not attempt to say what the general law means con-
cretely—except in application to the exhaustive descriptions of a
concrete situation given by opposing counsel. And it is willing to
give judgment on the basis of even svich descriptions only because
no completer knowledge can be had. And when the decision is
rendered, ideal justice is never done. The judgment of the court
at best is what the litigants should have known that it would be in
view of all previous relevant judgments. But we are considering
the problem of absolute right, for with it alone does ethics deal.
We are concerned about facts that can never be even approxi-
matelv determined and about the inner elusive motives of men's
deeds—not mereh', like the courts, in their proved deeds in cer-
tain largely standardized relationships. Therefore we cannot apply
a general devotion to ethical values to concrete situations zintJi any
e.vact)iess. that is, we cannot relate them by any logical process.
\\'e can only affirm, as we have done, that devotion to all ethical
values enables one to be just in concrete decisions because every
mind is ultimately one, because such devotion ennobles men, be-
cause men are thus saved from being led astra}' by any separate
virtue, and because the}- are able to express many conflicting values
in a single deed. \\'e can only add, as we did in the case of the
artistic values, that in so far as one in any case fails to advance
one value he will be advancing another—if he is sincerely devoted
to all values. Thus if one tells a minister that his discourse was
verv interesting—with a particular intonation—the minister is not
as hurt as if he had been told the full truth, and so charity has been
promoted, but even so he probably gets as much of the truth as he
can use.
V
If one accepts the doctrine of ethics which has been advocated
in this paper, then, in the first place, all meticulous, distressing self-
examination and inexorable self-condemnation for not equally for-
warding every virtue in every deed will be done away. They will
flee like shadows before the ascending sun. Then one will take a
carefree, joyous, welcoming, and so vital, attitude to life. And this
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attitude will enable one easily to correct, as opportunity presents
itself, the inevitable onesideness of any particular action. But if one
repudiates it, if he tries to be absolutely correct in every instance,
the soul will become so sensitive to evil that it will cling to its ac-
customed virtues in increasingly specialized forms, carry them to
extremes, ignoring the others, and in the resultant conflicts with
the sum of virtue and with persons with different codes the per-
sonality will become permanently distraught, suspicious, unjust.
In the second place, those who take what I may call the vital
attitude to ethics, will not, as the legalist must, by a priori standards
automatically rule out from consideration large classes of action
which, although innocent and relaxing are not the most worthy of
pursuit at the time. Thus the vitalists get the experience and enjoy-
ment of these kinds of action as they pass through the mind prior
to rejection in favor of the actions to be preferred. Therefore
their lives are incomparably richer than those of the legalists. And
their lives are not as defenseless before temptation as are those of
the legalists because, having often viewed all aspects of experience,
none can take them by surprise ; and because their moral natures
are strong by reason of repeated exercise upon innumerable oc-
casions.
In the third place, the ethical vitalist may find support for his
ethical living in religion. For God is simply that unity of all values,
which we have named the true standard of all living. The only
absolute unity is personality; so if all values are unified, it must be
in a personal God. John Calvin, as part of his doctrine of election,
taught that no deed could be good unless done unto the greater
glory of God. So we have taught that each act derives its virtue
from devotion to the sum total of ethical values. Religion, then,
differs from ethics only in emphasizing the final unity of non-com-
petitive values in personality, that is in God, and in inviting the
neophyte to make the non-competitive values regnant in his life
by using the most powerful motive known to men,—that of personal
attraction and devotion. So viewed, religion loses its special, con-
tradictory, obsolete commands. It strips itself of every impedi-
ment and is prepared to stride thru the ages abreast of the race,
ever calling mankind to transcend this or that partial truth in a
synthetic truth, because at all times it reminds of the holiest, high-
est. And the deliverance from the questioning pursuit of this or
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that one-sided abstraction of duty thus wrought will bring to the
human spirit a unity, a peace, a freedom and a power which in the
past it has full}- known only wdien the saints have mounted upon
the concrete commandents of their religions into the throne room
of the Eternal, and there have received words which made them
unwilling to serve aught less perfect than God forever more.
To labor for those whom we freely love and for those who need
succor from our abundance and to cultivate those values which,
like the widow's cruse of oil, ever replenish themselves for our need
and the need of all men—this is the wdiole duty of man. Surely
the way of life is broad and straight. Wherefore, having divested
ourselves of every needless anxiety from the days of our ignorance,
let us, O child of man, with fortitude and rejoicing, fare forth
upon it
!
